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On the background of economic development, the retail trade in china has made 
considerable progress already,but the relationship between the supplier and retailer is 
much more tense than before.Dissension between them appears like that retailers’ 
overbearing articles make supplier cann’t bear then revolt in some extreme form. The 
purpose of this article is to explore the resource of buyer power that the reason of this 
phenomena. 
There are thounds literatures on this issue. The characteristic of this article is that 
we shown upstream competition yield buyer by genenrating supplier-level volume 
uncertainty, using the two-person bargaining model as tool. 
Suppose when a retailer bargaining with a supplier,they divide the surplus what 
exceed their out option equally.there are many suppliers, retailer bargain with 
different suppliers in random order.Every bargaining course could be represent by a 
equation.Solving this simultaneous equations,we get the result——negotiated price 
that have something to do with buyers’ size,suppliers’ quantity and price when have 
no agreement with one supplier.Other parts of this model pay close attention to two 
questions:first, the effect of a change in upstream;second, the relationship between 
buyer power and competition among suppliers. 
At last,we make comments on slotting allowances.From the result of the model, 
we know that slotting allowances is reasonable,the way that eliminate the harmful 
effect of big retailers’ buyer power is make suppliers have countervailing power.This 
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第一章  绪论 









品市场稳定中加快增长的势头进一步增强。2004 年至 2008 年，我国社会消费品
零售总额实际增长速度分别为 10.2%、12%、12.6%、16.8%和 21.6%，增长速度逐





额以上连锁零售门店数达 145386 个，增长 12.7%。其中，超级市场 25185 个，
增长 19.5%；专业店 68967，增长 7.7%。2007 年限额以上连锁零售业零售额为





企业百强商品销售总额分别为 5599.98 亿元、7405.2 亿元、8742.6 亿元，同比
分别增长 33.2%、29.2%、18.1%。2006 年，我国零售业百强商品零售额占社会消
                                                        




























1.1.2  供零关系的紧张——以百安居“断货门”为例 
零售业的高度发展，相伴随的是供应商和零售商之间的紧张关系开始凸显。
过去的几年内，在中国的零售产业中，我们目睹了许多供应商和零售商之间的纠
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(monopsony power）、抗衡势力(countervailing power)、讨价还价能力(bargaining 
power)等众多名词混杂在一起适用。在本部分中，将详细列举其他研究人员作出
的各种定义，比较其不同，并从中选取一个适合本文的。 













                                                        
① Roger G.Noll. Buyer Power and Economic Policy[J]. Antitrust Law Journal,2004,(72):589-624. 
其原文为:Buyer power refers to the circumstances in which the demand side of a market is sufficiently 
concentrated that buyers can exercise market power over sellers. A buyer has market power if the buyer can 
force sellers to reduce price below the level that would emerge in a competitive market. Thus buyer power arises 
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